• ① 技術導入へのインセンティブ強化: 金融当局は資金交付制度の運用において、GRMtMAOSのような統合効率化システムの導入費用を明確に補助対象として位置付けるべきです。現在の枠組み(最大30億円補助 )を拡充し、実際にM1期間短縮に寄与する技術投資には上限いっぱいの支援を行うことで、銀行側の導入意欲を高められます。また補助金だけでなく、統合を決断した地銀同士に対し金融庁が技術面のアドバイザリーを提供したり、ベンダー選定の情報提供を行うなどソフト面の支援も有効です。
• ② インフラの標準化・共同化の推進: 極論すれば、地方銀行が皆同じ勘定系プラットフォーム上で動けば統合作業は飛躍的に容易になります。現状でもNTTデータの地銀共同センターなど複数行でシステムを共同利用する例がありますが、今後はそれをクラウド上でより柔軟に利用できる「統合バンキングクラウド」の構築が検討されています 。NTTデータは2028年頃を目途に共同利用型勘定系を順次クラウドに載せる計画であり 、これによりデータセンターやハードの統合管理で金融機関のシステム管理負担を軽減し、各行は競争領域にリソースを集中できるとしています 。政策的にも、こうした共通基盤への移行を促進することで、将来の統合に備えた「下地作り」を進めるべきです。具体的には、共同センター参加行への補助や税制優遇、あるいは地域ごとの勘定系共同化に対する預金保険機構の支援枠新設などが考えられます。業界標準の統合プラットフォームを確立し、その上でGRMtMAOSのようなリアルタイム連携技術を組み合わせれば、もはや統合におけるシステム障壁は限りなくゼロに近づくでしょう。
• ③ 統合プロセスの制度面整備: 法的な合併手続きや認可のプロセスも、技術進化に合わせて見直しが必要です。現行ではシステム統合に時間がかかる前提で統合準備期間が考慮されていますが、今後M1短縮が常態化すればより迅速な認可フローが求められます。金融庁や関係当局には、統合スキームの柔軟な運用(例えば形式上は持株会社方式から短期間で吸収合併に移行することの許容など)や、統合初期の顧客保護策ガイドライン策定など、新技術を織り込んだ制度整備を提言します。また、統合後のモニタリング体制についても、統合効果が迅速に出る分、統合による地域金融への影響を早期に検証・フォローアップする仕組みが必要です。具体的には、統合行に対し「統合効果の事後検証報告」を求め、コスト削減や地域貸出の増減をチェックするなど、統合が地域経済に資する形で行われているか監督することも大切でしょう。
銀行法との関係: FlowNowは銀行ではないため預金の受入れ行為は禁止されます。ユーザ(購入者)や加盟店から資金を預かり一時プールする場合でも、銀行法上の「預金等」に該当しないよう注意が必要です。そのため、あくまで決済の媒介として即時に資金を動かすだけで継続的に預かり金を保持しないスキームとします。例えば加盟店の資金をFlowNow口座に留め置かず即時送金する、購入者からの前払い残高は預り金としてではなく前払式支払手段(電子マネー)として扱う等の工夫が考えられます。また近年は銀行サービスの一部を非銀行が提供できるよう銀行法が改正(Banking as a Service推進)されています。FlowNowも銀行APIを活用することで銀行機能の一端を実現しており、銀行法の趣旨に反しない形でのサービス設計が可能です。
信用履歴ベースのAPI提供: FreeTrustは蓄積された信用データや即時決済機能を外部企業にも提供するAPIエコノミーを構築できます。例えば、他のフリーランスマーケットプレイスや求人サイトがFreeTrustの信用スコアAPIを利用して候補者の信頼度を照会したり、金融機関がローン審査の際にFreeTrustのデータを参照するといった利用が想定されます。これはFreeTrustにとって新たな収入源となり得ます。信用スコアや取引履歴の提供には利用料を課すことで、**信用インフラそのものをサービス化(Trust as a Service)**します。すでにブロックチェーン上のDID(分散型ID)や検証可能な資格情報を提供するソリューションは登場しており、FreeTrustもそうした分野で標準的存在となることを目指します 。たとえば企業がフリーランス採用時にAPI経由で候補者の「デジタル信用パスポート」を確認し、即時に信頼できる人材か判断できる世界です。
RTGSにおいては、各銀行が中央銀行に保有する当座預金口座を介して、取引ごとに即時でかつ最終的な決済が実現される。このモデルは高い信頼性と最終性を持つものの、**単一障害点(SPOF: Single Point of Failure)**の存在、システム運用・接続コスト、そして参加行に対する流動性拘束といった課題も内在している。
GRMtMAOS Global Reciprocal Many-to-Many Account Opening System: A New Model for Distributed Interbank Transfers
Chapter 1: Overview
This paper introduces the conceptual design and mechanism of GRMtMAOS (Global Reciprocal Many-to-Many Account Opening System), a novel, decentralized payment network for interbank transfers. It proposes an alternative to traditional centralized infrastructures like Japan’s Zengin System or central bank RTGS platforms, offering a many-to-many structured remittance model.
At the heart of GRMtMAOS lies the “reciprocal deposit account model,” wherein each participating bank opens and maintains internal deposit accounts in the names of every other participating bank. This structure allows interbank transactions to be executed entirely through ledger adjustments—without the actual movement of central bank reserves or cash.
This document systematically explores the fundamental structure of GRMtMAOS, step-by-step transfer processing, comparison with centralized models, implementation feasibility, and technical considerations, presenting a forward-looking alternative for next-generation payment systems.
Chapter 2: Introduction
International interbank settlements have historically relied on centralized infrastructures in each country.
For domestic remittances, systems such as Japan’s Zengin System or central bank-operated RTGS (Real-Time Gross Settlement) are common. Banks send transfer instructions to these centralized bodies, which handle processing and settlement.
In Zengin-net, remittance data is aggregated in real-time at a central hub (the Zengin Center), which communicates transfer details to recipient banks. At the end of each business day, the total net positions among banks are calculated and settled using their current accounts at the central bank.
RTGS allows for real-time, final settlement through each bank’s current account at the central bank. Though reliable and secure, this model has several limitations—including a single point of failure (SPOF), high operational and integration costs, and liquidity constraints for participants.
Internationally, the traditional system relies on SWIFT-based correspondent banking (Nostro/Vostro accounts), which is costly, complex, and slow to finalize.
Recently, blockchain and Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) have sparked global momentum toward decentralized payment systems without centralized clearing intermediaries. GRMtMAOS fits into this trend, proposing a many-to-many interbank connection network that enhances and extends existing systems.
Chapter 3: Proposal – The Reciprocal Deposit Account Model
The core architecture of GRMtMAOS is the Reciprocal Deposit Account Model, in which each participating bank opens and maintains internal deposit accounts in the names of all other participating banks. In other words, each bank treats the others as “clients” and maintains named deposit accounts on a many-to-many basis.
This architecture generalizes the traditional Nostro/Vostro account system into a symmetric, global framework.
For instance, if Bank A and Bank B are part of the GRMtMAOS network, Bank A has a deposit account under Bank B’s name, and Bank B has a reciprocal account under Bank A’s name.
These accounts function as follows:
From Bank A’s perspective, the account under Bank B’s name is a liability—it represents money owed to Bank B.
From Bank B’s perspective, the account under Bank A’s name is also a liability—money owed to Bank A.
Conversely, each bank considers the account it holds with the other as an asset (receivable).
This system forms a direct, bilateral claims network among banks, removing the need for central clearing mechanisms or intervention by central banks.
Instead of a hub-and-spoke system, the GRMtMAOS network is a full mesh in which each node (bank) is directly and symmetrically connected to every other node. This allows for a decentralized, highly redundant configuration.
Chapter 4: Transfer Processing Mechanism (Two Steps)
The GRMtMAOS transfer process is completed entirely through interbank ledger entries. No physical cash or central bank reserves are transferred. To illustrate the mechanism, we explain the two-step process using an example: a customer (Mr. X) at Bank A sends $10,000 to a customer (Ms. Y) at Bank B.
Step 1: Creation of Interbank Claims and Liabilities
Bank A deducts $10,000 from Mr. X’s account.
Simultaneously, Bank A credits $10,000 to the internal deposit account held in the name of Bank B.
This results in two accounting entries within Bank A:
Customer deposit liability decreases by $10,000.
Bank B’s deposit account (a liability to another bank) increases by $10,000.
At this point, Bank A holds a $10,000 receivable (asset) from Bank B, having effectively transferred the funds.
Bank B, upon receiving the transfer instruction, credits $10,000 to the internal deposit account held in the name of Bank A:
Bank A’s account (a liability for holding Bank A’s funds) increases by $10,000.
Thus, Bank B now owes $10,000 to Bank A, having acknowledged the receipt of funds not yet delivered to the end customer.
Resulting interbank positions:
Bank A → Receivable from Bank B: $10,000.
Bank B → Payable to Bank A: $10,000.
Step 2: Crediting the Recipient’s Account
Based on Bank A’s instruction and the $10,000 liability on its books, Bank B credits Ms. Y’s account with $10,000.
Bank B’s accounting entries:
Customer deposit liability (Ms. Y): +$10,000.
Bank A’s account (interbank liability): –$10,000.
The $10,000 deposit to Ms. Y’s account is offset by the reduction in Bank B’s liability to Bank A. The transfer is now complete both on the customer and interbank levels.
This two-step process shows that:
Bank A is deemed to have transferred Mr. X’s funds to Bank B.
Bank B, based on that record, credits its customer Ms. Y.
Importantly, no actual cash or central bank settlement occurs. The entire transaction is processed through ledger entries (receivables, payables, and deposits) only.
This model allows banks to handle large volumes of transfers with minimal liquidity. Moreover, multiple transactions can be aggregated and netted, reducing overall clearing requirements.
Chapter 5: Implementation Feasibility
To apply the GRMtMAOS framework to real-world banking, careful planning and phased implementation are necessary from both technical and operational perspectives. This chapter considers its feasibility.
1. System Design and Technical Infrastructure
GRMtMAOS requires each participating bank to open mutual deposit accounts for every other participant, forming a many-to-many structure. With n participating banks, up to n(n–1) reciprocal relationships must be managed. This demands a highly automated IT backbone and standardized APIs.
Modern banking infrastructure (e.g., REST APIs, Webhooks, ISO 20022) already supports real-time data exchange. GRMtMAOS would require:
An account management system that accurately tracks balances and transaction histories for each mutual account.
A messaging protocol that initiates and synchronizes transfer instructions bidirectionally between banks.
A robust security layer (encryption, digital signatures, authentication) and failover/retry mechanisms in the event of network disruptions.
2. Ledger Technology Options
While GRMtMAOS does not inherently require blockchain or crypto-based infrastructure, it can benefit from distributed ledger technologies (DLT) to record and share interbank balances and transaction histories without reliance on a centralized server.
Possible configurations include:
Pairwise local ledgers: Each bilateral relationship is maintained on a shared, localized ledger that records only mutual balances and transactions.
Global network ledger: A single distributed ledger that centrally logs all interbank receivables and payables across the network.
While DLT improves redundancy and tamper resistance, it can introduce latency in transaction finality. To enable real-time transfers, efficient ledger consensus mechanisms and architectural choices must be considered.
3. Credit Risk Management and Exposure Limits
In GRMtMAOS, each interbank relationship represents a de facto line of credit. Therefore, credit risk management becomes a critical implementation concern.
Each bank must assign credit limits to counterparties. Transactions exceeding the limit are either declined or split in real time.
Bilateral balances are netted periodically, with optional settlement using cash or central bank money when necessary.
Risk mitigation measures like collateral arrangements and credit guarantee funds should be integrated to maintain network stability.
These practices can be adapted from existing models such as RTGS or CLS (Continuous Linked Settlement) systems.
4. Messaging Protocols and Communication Standards
To execute interbank transfers securely and reliably, strict messaging protocols are required to ensure synchronization, authentication, and data integrity.
GRMtMAOS may incorporate:
ISO 20022-based XML messages: SWIFT-compatible structured formats.
REST/JSON lightweight APIs: For modern, flexible integration.
Smart contracts: For compatibility with blockchain-based automation.
In all cases, transaction finality must be confirmed by symmetric entries at both ends, not just unilateral processing. End-to-end verification is essential to avoid discrepancies and ensure trust.
Chapter 6: Technical Considerations
This chapter outlines four key technical considerations associated with the implementation and operation of GRMtMAOS.
1. Improved Liquidity Efficiency
GRMtMAOS enables interbank transfers without requiring actual cash or central bank reserves. As a result, liquidity provisioning per transaction is no longer necessary. Benefits include:
Banks can process many transactions with minimal liquidity reserves.
Bilateral transactions naturally balance each other out, reducing overall liquidity demand.
Netting of accumulated transactions further compresses settlement volume.
For instance, if multiple bidirectional payments occur throughout the day, they can be settled using account balance adjustments alone, without repeated central bank intervention.
2. Reliability of a Decentralized Network
GRMtMAOS reduces the risk of a Single Point of Failure (SPOF) by eliminating dependence on a central clearing house. Each bank maintains direct bilateral relationships, and transactions are settled pairwise.
If a particular bank or region experiences outages,
Transactions between unaffected banks can still proceed uninterrupted.
Necessary safeguards include:
Fallback communication protocols for disrupted connections.
Balance reconciliation and ledger correction after recovery.
Integrity verification mechanisms across the network to ensure consistency.
This approach ensures both high availability and ledger consistency.
3. Scalability and Complexity
The GRMtMAOS model scales exponentially. With more participating banks, the number of account relationships increases proportionally: n(n–1). While advantageous for global full connectivity, this also introduces challenges:
Increased operational load per bank (e.g., account management, risk monitoring).
Higher IT costs for system development and maintenance.
Need for individualized credit line and risk settings per counterparty.
A phased rollout is advisable. Possible initial scopes:
Deploy within regional or affiliated banking groups.
Use in emerging markets lacking a central clearing house.
Targeted implementation for specific cross-border remittance use cases.
4. Regulatory and Institutional Compatibility
GRMtMAOS can operate within existing legal and regulatory frameworks. It builds on concepts already familiar in correspondent banking and bilateral credit relationships.
Each bank grants and records credit to its counterparties via internal deposit accounts. This aligns with existing interbank deposit and lending practices, and is compliant from multiple regulatory angles:
Reciprocal account balances qualify as interbank deposits under banking law, and can be assessed under existing capital adequacy and credit risk frameworks.
Credit exposures can be managed under current large exposure rules and assigned risk weights according to internal or external ratings.
Supervisory authorities can validate GRMtMAOS using transparent ledger records, without requiring regulatory reform.
In addition, use of clearinghouses or credit guarantee mechanisms further strengthens the system’s resilience in the event of a participant default.
Therefore, GRMtMAOS is best seen not as a regulatory challenge, but as an innovation aligned with existing structures—reducing the social and legal barriers to adoption.
Chapter 7: Conclusion
This paper has proposed a new model for interbank transfers called the Global Reciprocal Many-to-Many Account Opening System (GRMtMAOS). It presented the foundational principles, mechanisms, implementation feasibility, and both institutional and technical considerations for its deployment.
GRMtMAOS is based on the reciprocal deposit account model, in which banks open deposit accounts for one another under each other’s names. This architecture allows interbank fund transfers to be completed entirely through internal ledger entries, without the use of centralized clearing institutions or real-time central bank settlement.
The primary benefits of this model include:
Reduced liquidity burden by avoiding actual cash transfers.
Elimination of centralized dependency through a mesh-structured, redundant, and decentralized design.
Greater net settlement efficiency by offsetting bidirectional transaction histories.
Technological feasibility via existing banking ledger systems, APIs, and optional DLT integrations.
Regulatory alignment with current banking law, capital adequacy regulations, and credit risk assessment systems.
However, practical implementation requires careful design in areas such as credit risk management, counterparty limits, messaging standards, fallback procedures, and recovery protocols. A phased, modular rollout is advised.
Importantly, GRMtMAOS does not seek to replace central bank-led models, but to complement and extend them. For example, central bank RTGS systems can still be used for final net settlements, while GRMtMAOS handles frequent, low-value daytime transactions via credit-based bilateral accounts. This hybrid approach opens the door to a more flexible and sustainable payments infrastructure.
In conclusion, this proposal lays the groundwork for a global payment network that operates independently of legacy systems while remaining compatible with legal and institutional requirements. Next steps include pilot implementations, standardization efforts, regulatory dialogue, and targeted use case deployments.
GRMtMAOS represents a meaningful step forward in reimagining 21st-century financial infrastructure.
Feasibility and Pilot Protocols for Implementation in Mainland China and the Hong Kong SAR
Chapter 1: Introduction
This second report explores the legal and institutional feasibility of implementing the Generalized Reciprocal Many-to-Many Account Opening System (GRMtMAOS) in Mainland China and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Both jurisdictions have advanced banking systems but distinct legal foundations. This paper aims to provide region-specific pilot protocols while examining the policy, legal, and operational compatibility of GRMtMAOS.
Chapter 2: Mainland China
2.1 Legal Conditions and Challenges
Interbank clearing and settlement typically rely on state-controlled systems such as UnionPay and NetUnion.
Credit data management is centralized under the National Credit Information Center (CIC), and integration may be legally mandatory.
Independent operation of GRMtMAOS would require formal designation or approval from the People’s Bank of China (PBOC).
2.2 Deployment Strategy
A fully private-led model is unrealistic. A public–private joint initiative under PBOC oversight is more viable.
Focused use cases should include:
Credit netting among state-owned enterprises
Real-time tracking of public spending
2.3 Pilot Protocol – People’s Republic of China
Title: GRMtMAOS Pilot Protocol for the People’s Republic of China
Objective: To assess technical, legal, and operational feasibility of GRMtMAOS under PBOC, targeting public-sector use cases.
参考文献(References) 1. 高司 Kozykozy(2025)『互恵勘定ネットワーク送金システムとその思想』Kozykozy.com(https://kozykozy.com/2025/05/) 2. 金融庁(2023)『電子決済等代替手段に関するガイドライン(ステーブルコイン関連)』 3. 日本銀行(2023)『中央銀行デジタル通貨に関する実証実験報告書(フェーズ2)』 4. BIS (Bank for International Settlements) (2022). Options for access to and interoperability of CBDCs. BIS Report. 5. Ripple Labs Inc. (2021). RippleNet Overview & On-Demand Liquidity Technical Whitepaper 6. Circle Internet Financial (2023). USDC Transparency Report. 7. 金融庁(2021)『資金決済法改正に伴う電子マネーの法的位置づけ』 8. 世界銀行(2024)『Remittance Prices Worldwide (Issue 49)』 9. IMF (2021). The Rise of Digital Money. IMF Working Paper No. WP/21/145 10. デジタル庁(2023)『デジタル社会のインフラ戦略』 11. SBIレミット株式会社(2021)『RippleのODLを用いた国際送金に関する業務報告』 12. Wise (旧TransferWise) (2023) 『国際送金と国内送金の手数料比較レポート』 13. 全国銀行資金決済ネットワーク(全銀ネット)(2022)『全銀システムの構成と手数料体系』 14. 三菱UFJ信託銀行(2024)『Progmat Coin構想と預金トークンの社会実装』
Thesis Title:Digitizing Legal Tender and Rebuilding Payment Infrastructure through GRMtMAOS — A Comparative Analysis of E-Money, Stablecoins, and Global Currency Networks —
Author: [Name] Kozykozy, the Singing Inventor [Affiliation] Inventor of Infrastructure Remake
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Abstract This paper re-evaluates bank deposits as the “digital form of legal tender” and proposes a new infrastructure for direct and high-speed circulation called GRMtMAOS (Global Reciprocal Many-to-Many Account Opening System). While e-money, stablecoins, and cryptocurrencies have been discussed as alternatives to legal tender, none can qualify as true legal tender guaranteed by national authority.
E-money systems suffer from structural problems, such as cash flow strain and payment delays for merchants, while cryptocurrencies and stablecoins lack the legitimacy of sovereign monetary authority. GRMtMAOS, by contrast, is a network that facilitates the movement of deposits directly between banks without central clearing, enabling real-time settlement, low-cost transactions, AML compliance, and credit management. In fact, the only system that fully addresses the structural flaws of e-money is CaelPay, which is built upon the GRMtMAOS framework.
The key premise of this work is the recognition that bank deposits already represent digital legal tender. Returning to the foundation of currency systems and financial infrastructure, banks remain the most reliable institutions for managing sovereign currency. This paper examines how GRMtMAOS contributes to Japan’s monetary policy, cashless economy, cross-border payments, disaster response, and the future of currency infrastructure from legal, cost, and technological perspectives.
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Table of Contents 1. Introduction 2. Bank Deposits and Legal Tender: A Misunderstood Relationship 3. The Structure and Design Principles of GRMtMAOS 4. The Limits of E-Money and the Significance of CaelPay 5. Comparison with Stablecoins, Cryptocurrencies, and Ripple 6. Cross-Border Transfers and the Return to Bank-Centered Exchange 7. Legal and Regulatory Alignment 8. Applications in Public Policy, Welfare, and Emergency Payments 9. Monetary Sovereignty and Japan’s Strategic Future 10. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
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Appendix Excerpt Popular e-money services currently circulating in Japan, such as PayPay, carry serious structural flaws behind their convenience. These problems boil down to two core issues: (1) the prepaid nature of the system, and (2) the delay in transferring funds to merchants. While the consumer’s payment is completed instantly, the merchant may not receive the actual funds until three days later—or in some cases, as long as sixty days.
This creates cash flow stress for merchants and places an unfair burden on their operations. In essence, merchants are involuntarily acting as interest-free lenders to e-money providers. Logically, these providers should compensate merchants with interest based on the length of the delay.
The only solution that fundamentally resolves this issue is CaelPay. With CaelPay, funds are settled instantly at the time of transaction, and the entire system is built on the GRMtMAOS framework. CaelPay functions as true digital cash, enabling real-time movement of bank deposits. It represents a practical application of GRMtMAOS invented by Kozykozy, the Singing Inventor.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
In today’s financial economy, the trends of cashless payments and currency digitalization are irreversible. In Japan, QR code payments and smartphone-based e-money are part of daily life, while internationally, central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) and stablecoins are gaining attention as next-generation money.
However, one fundamental fact is often overlooked: bank deposits are the most widely used digital form of legal tender. The ability to settle transactions without cash or coins—via transfers or withdrawals—is only possible because deposits are digitally managed and backed by the same trust as physical money. Yet modern debates increasingly frame “digital currency” and “e-money” as replacements for legal tender, sowing confusion in monetary policy and regulation.
In addition, Japanese e-money services, though convenient for consumers, present serious challenges for merchants. While payments appear “instant,” the actual transfer of funds to merchants is frequently delayed by several days or even weeks. This effectively results in interest-free lending from merchants to e-money firms, straining their cash flow. If this structure continues unchecked, it risks undermining the very purpose of promoting cashless payments.
This paper proposes GRMtMAOS as a complete redesign of digital cash infrastructure—one led by banks. Under this model, banks open reciprocal deposit accounts for each other, enabling real-time, trust-based interbank transfers without central clearing.
This chapter outlines the problems in current settlement systems and introduces the structure and significance of GRMtMAOS, setting the stage for the chapters that follow.
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Chapter 2: Bank Deposits and Legal Tender — A Misunderstood Relationship
2.1 Bank Deposits Are Already Digital Currency
With the advancement of financial technology, the term “digital currency” has become widespread. However, in many cases it is narrowly interpreted to mean “crypto-assets based on blockchain” or “central bank digital currencies (CBDCs)” such as the digital yen.
In truth, bank deposits are already a complete form of digital currency. Modern deposits are not recorded in physical passbooks, but are managed electronically in bank data centers and transferred across bank networks for daily payments and settlements. Whether a user withdraws cash from an ATM or transfers money online is merely a matter of method—the deposit itself is a digital representation of legal tender.
The primary reason this fact is overlooked lies in the legal distinction between deposits as “claims” rather than “money,” and the general societal understanding that “1 yen is 1 yen.” Legally, a bank deposit is a claim—a right to demand repayment from the bank—distinct from physical cash. However, in practice, we use deposits exactly like money. As long as bank deposits function for transfers, withdrawals, and payments, they are effectively the digital form of legal tender.
2.2 The Fundamental Difference from E-Money
From this perspective, the essential differences between bank deposits and instruments like e-money or stablecoins become apparent. E-money represents a proprietary digital value issued by private entities and is legally categorized as either a prepaid payment instrument or a means of funds transfer under Japanese law. What users perceive as “yen” is, in fact, a corporate-issued point with yen equivalence, backed by the issuing company’s credit.
In contrast, bank deposits are protected up to a certain limit by deposit insurance, and in the event of failure, are overseen by the Financial Services Agency. Furthermore, banks have direct access to the Bank of Japan’s current accounts, which are fully backed central bank money—placing deposits at the very core of the monetary system.
In short, while bank deposits are not legal tender in a strict legal sense, they are extremely stable digital currency grounded in national systems, fundamentally distinct from e-money or cryptocurrencies.
2.3 Requirements of Legal Tender and the Limits of Ripple, Cryptocurrencies
For any country to exist, it must issue a currency and guarantee its value. Currency supports national sovereignty—it must function in taxation, wage payments, and debt settlements. This is the essence of legal tender.
Ripple, cryptocurrencies, and stablecoins do not meet these criteria. No matter how widely circulated or price-stable they may appear, currencies not issued by a state can never be considered legal tender. While they may serve as mediums of exchange, they lack the legal force of compulsory acceptance and are not backed by sovereign guarantees.
From this perspective, the most viable path for future digital currency development is not to invent new currencies, but rather to enable the seamless and real-time distribution of bank deposits, which are already institutionally integrated.
2.4 Institutional Risks in PayPay Balances and Inheritance
Funds charged to services like PayPay are legally regarded as prepaid payment instruments or electronic payment methods based on the Funds Settlement Act. If a user charges ¥1,000,000 to PayPay, it legally means they have purchased a balance or token within the service worth that amount.
Because of this legal classification, balances such as “PayPay Money Lite” or “PayPay Points” may not be eligible for inheritance upon the user’s death. That is, the bereaved family may not be able to claim them, and the unused balance may be recorded as non-operating income for PayPay, Inc. In contrast, “PayPay Money,” which is tied to identity verification, is regarded as a legitimate asset under the Funds Settlement Act and may be claimed via inheritance.
Thus, whether e-money balances are inheritable depends on their classification. Many users are unaware of this distinction, which poses legal risks. In practice, if a large amount is charged without proper identity verification, those funds may be effectively lost upon the user’s death. This again underscores the need to return to bank deposit infrastructure, where legal protections are clearly defined.
Moreover, in the future, merchants may become more aware of this imbalance and demand compensation for delayed deposits of sales proceeds. For example, within the next 10 years, collective lawsuits may arise, demanding restitution of interest that should have been paid on sales withheld for days or weeks. This presents a serious potential legal and financial liability for e-money providers.
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Chapter 3: The Structure and Design Principles of GRMtMAOS
3.1 Basic Concept and Architecture
GRMtMAOS (Global Reciprocal Many-to-Many Account Opening System) is a distributed, many-to-many remittance network that can be built on top of existing banking infrastructure. At the heart of this concept is a reciprocal account model, in which each participating bank opens deposit accounts under the names of all other participating banks within its own system. This allows interbank transfers, which have traditionally required central systems like the Zengin Net or Bank of Japan RTGS, to be completed through intra-bank ledger entries.
Japan’s conventional remittance infrastructure has long relied on the Zengin System—a centralized clearing network connecting all banks nationwide. While it provides high reliability, it has limitations such as high maintenance costs, restricted operating hours, redundancy, and barriers to participation. In particular, it has struggled to adapt to real-time processing and high-frequency micro-transactions.
GRMtMAOS overcomes these limitations by creating direct bilateral links between banks, forming a decentralized and real-time settlement network. Specifically, each bank in the network opens deposit accounts for every other participating bank within its own internal ledger. Funds are then transferred using a two-step process: 1. At the sending bank: A transfer is made from the sender’s account to the recipient bank’s designated account (e.g., from Mr. X’s account at Bank A to the “Bank B Account” at Bank A).
2.Processing within the beneficiary bank: Transfer from the beneficiary bank’s special deposit account to the beneficiary’s account (e.g., within Bank B, funds are transferred from Bank B’s special deposit account (asset account) to Mr. Y’s account).
These two steps are executed entirely within the core systems of the respective banks, allowing settlement without passing through a central institution such as Zengin Net or the Bank of Japan. Technically, this requires only lightweight APIs, messaging synchronization, transaction approval protocols, and a shared management server to coordinate the process.
3.2 Technical Features and Benefits
GRMtMAOS offers several notable technical characteristics: • Real-time settlement: Transactions are reflected immediately without waiting for central clearing. • Cost minimization: Eliminates network usage fees paid to systems like Zengin Net or SWIFT. • 24/7/365 operation: Always-on availability, as agreed upon by participating banks. • Capital efficiency: No need for prefunding or idle capital pools. • Scalability: The more banks participate, the more valuable the network becomes (network externalities). • Transparency and auditability: All transactions are recorded and monitored via a shared management server.
Moreover, unlike blockchains or crypto-assets, GRMtMAOS transmits actual legal tender (bank deposits) in digital form, minimizing price volatility and avoiding regulatory inconsistencies. In essence, it provides a blockchain-style payment network without tokens—using secure, regulated financial infrastructure.
3.3 Implementation Requirements and Legal Compatibility
One of the advantages of GRMtMAOS is that it does not require large-scale infrastructure overhauls. It can be implemented by making the following enhancements to each bank’s existing systems: • Management of reciprocal (other-bank) account ledgers • APIs for sending and receiving remittance instructions • Confirmation and logging of transactions • Balance control and risk limits (e.g., caps, credit thresholds) • Synchronization messaging with the shared management server
Legally, this model involves only intra-bank account transfers, which fall squarely within the scope of deposit and funds transfer services as defined under Japan’s Banking Act. Since no new currencies or financial instruments are being issued, securities laws, e-money regulations, or stablecoin-related legislation do not apply. This significantly reduces regulatory friction and lowers the threshold for adoption.
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Chapter 4: The Limits of E-Money and the Significance of CaelPay
4.1 Structural Limitations of E-Money
In Japan, the rise of cashless payments has been driven largely by QR code-based payment apps and prepaid e-money systems. Services like PayPay, Rakuten Pay, d-Barai, Merpay, and Suica have grown rapidly due to their convenience and point-reward campaigns, especially from the consumer’s perspective.
However, these e-money systems are increasingly revealing structural limitations and contradictions, such as: • Capital lock-in due to prepaid structure: Users must first top up from cash or bank deposits into their e-money account, effectively lending money to the operator before spending. This is an inefficient model that locks user funds. • Merchant cash flow disruption: Despite providing goods or services, merchants often wait several days to weeks to receive their sales proceeds. Instead of instant settlement, payments are delayed due to the operator’s internal processing schedule. • Illusion of instant payment: Consumers may feel that they’ve paid instantly, but in reality, merchants may not receive funds until much later, undermining the perception of real-time payment. • Lack of legal protection: E-money balances are typically not covered by deposit insurance, and if the operator fails, user funds may not be fully protected. Furthermore, issues around inheritance remain unclear (as discussed in Chapter 2). • Walled-garden ecosystems: Multiple e-money providers operate independently, with limited interoperability. This results in inefficiencies for both users and merchants.
These problems suggest that while e-money is convenient, it is ultimately an incomplete form of digital payment infrastructure.
4.2 Unfair Burden on Merchants and Future Risks
One of the most critical issues is the unfair burden placed on merchants’ cash flow. Ideally, merchants should receive payments instantly upon a transaction. Yet, in many cases—such as with PayPay—settlement may take at least three business days, and sometimes up to 60 days depending on monthly cycles.
Effectively, this means that merchants are lending money to e-money operators interest-free. From a financial standpoint, this is a hidden cost imposed on the merchant side, and it is only reasonable that merchants should receive interest or compensation for delayed fund transfers.
In the future, as merchants become more aware of this structural imbalance, there is a very real possibility of collective legal action. Some legal experts and business leaders are already flagging this issue. Within the next 10 years, we may see lawsuits demanding restitution for the interest lost due to delayed settlement. For e-money operators, this represents a serious financial and legal liability.
4.3 The Only Real Solution: The Emergence of CaelPay
Among existing solutions, only CaelPay successfully addresses these structural problems. Built on the GRMtMAOS model, CaelPay provides a next-generation payment infrastructure with the following key features: • Instant settlement to merchants: Once the consumer completes payment, funds are immediately deposited into the merchant’s bank account, finalizing the transaction in real time. • Deposit-based transactions: CaelPay uses interbank transfers of actual bank deposits instead of issuing prepaid balances, eliminating the need for prefunding. • Alignment with national systems: Since payments involve legal tender in the form of bank deposits, CaelPay operates fully within the framework of deposit insurance and financial supervision by the FSA. • Risk-free, transparent transactions: Both users and merchants benefit from full confidence in the system, without ambiguous fees or credit risk.
CaelPay was conceived and developed based on the vision of Kozykozy, the Singing Inventor, and is the first commercial implementation of GRMtMAOS’s real-time, bidirectional account model. It offers both merchants and consumers an ideal digital cash experience and has the potential to become a future industry standard.
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Chapter 5: Comparison with Stablecoins, Cryptocurrencies, and Ripple
5.1 The Rise and Characteristics of Stablecoins
Stablecoins are a class of digital assets designed to maintain a stable value by pegging to legal currencies or assets. Common examples include USD-pegged stablecoins like USDT (Tether), USDC (USD Coin), and decentralized models such as DAI.
Stablecoins typically exist on distributed ledger technology (DLT), such as blockchain platforms, and are broadly categorized into: • Asset-backed models: Issuers hold reserves like fiat cash or government bonds to back issued tokens (e.g., USDC, JPYC). • Algorithmic models: Value is stabilized through programmatic mechanisms based on supply and demand (e.g., DAI, formerly UST).
While these seem like blockchain-based versions of fiat currencies, they face several serious limitations and risks: • Legally categorized as crypto-assets, not currencies • Strongly dependent on issuer credibility or reserve quality • Underdeveloped frameworks for inheritance or legal tender status • Susceptible to market volatility and pegging failures (e.g., the TerraUSD collapse)
To function as a true substitute for fiat, stablecoins must meet standards of institutional stability and value preservation, which many currently do not.
5.2 Ripple’s Approach: On-Demand Liquidity via Bridge Currencies
Ripple Labs aims to improve the speed and cost efficiency of cross-border transactions using its proprietary XRP Ledger and On-Demand Liquidity (ODL) solution.
The ODL process operates as follows: 1. Convert the sender’s fiat into XRP in real time 2. Transmit XRP across the network within seconds 3. Convert XRP into the recipient’s local fiat currency
By bypassing traditional correspondent banking channels and pre-funded accounts, this model is considered innovative. However, several concerns remain: • XRP price volatility: Even with short transfer windows, exchange rate risks persist • Regulatory ambiguity: Ripple has faced ongoing legal battles in the U.S. regarding XRP’s classification as a security • Issuer control: Ripple Labs retains a large supply of XRP, raising concerns about decentralization • Dependence on crypto markets: Liquidity and rates are subject to crypto exchange conditions
Ripple’s model prioritizes speed, but faces ongoing issues with value stability and regulatory alignment.
5.3 Fundamental Differences with GRMtMAOS
While both Ripple and stablecoins share the goal of real-time, low-cost, global settlement, GRMtMAOS differs fundamentally in structure, stability, and institutional design:
Criteria Stablecoins Ripple (ODL) GRMtMAOS Currency backing Asset reserves or algorithmic logic XRP (crypto-asset) Bank deposits (legal tender) Price stability Depends on reserve quality Subject to market volatility Stable (e.g., 1 yen = 1 yen) Counterparty credit risk Relies on issuer or exchanges XRP liquidity and Ripple network Mitigated via interbank credit limits Regulatory status Often underdeveloped Varies by country Within existing banking & settlement law Transaction processing Blockchain-based (DLT) XRP Ledger Internal bank ledger entries Volatility Partially unavoidable High None
As this table illustrates, GRMtMAOS offers a balanced combination of decentralized architecture, currency stability, and full legal compliance. It preserves the core qualities essential to a functioning monetary system: trust and stability
Criteria
Stablecoins
Ripple (ODL)
GRMtMAOS
Currency backing
Asset reserves or algorithmic logic
XRP (crypto-asset)
Bank deposits (legal tender)
Price stability
Depends on reserve quality
Subject to market volatility
Stable (e.g., 1 yen = 1 yen)
Counterparty credit risk
Relies on issuer or exchanges
XRP liquidity and Ripple network
Mitigated via interbank credit limits
Regulatory status
Often underdeveloped
Varies by country
Within existing banking & settlement law
Transaction processing
Blockchain-based (DLT)
XRP Ledger
Internal bank ledger entries
Volatility
Partially unavoidable
High
None
5.4 Rediscovering the Most Reliable Foundation
What deserves the most attention is the fact that bank deposits themselves are already a practical form of digital legal tender. While Ripple, stablecoins, and CBDCs all aim to create “digitally native money,” the most secure and proven system—bank deposits—already exists.
GRMtMAOS does not propose creating new tokens or currencies. Rather, it maximizes the potential of deposit money through an interbank settlement network that is fast, transparent, and scalable—all without leaving the legal and institutional framework. In doing so, it brings innovation full circle, returning to the foundational, regulated assets that society already trusts.
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Chapter 6: Cross-Border Transfers and the Return to Bank-Centered Exchange
6.1 Current Problems in International Remittances
International remittances today remain plagued by high costs, long processing times, and lack of transparency. Traditional cross-border payments typically rely on the SWIFT network and multiple intermediary banks, which introduces several inefficiencies: • Long processing times: 2 to 5 business days on average, with further delays due to time zones and holidays • Layered fees: Including remitter fees, recipient fees, and intermediary bank fees • Unfavorable FX rates: Often includes hidden spreads between TTS and TTB, disadvantaging users • Lack of traceability: Users have difficulty tracking the status of their transfers
For example, foreign workers sending money to developing countries may lose up to 10% of the transaction in fees when remitting just $200. This has become a global development issue recognized by the United Nations (SDG 10.c: reducing remittance costs to less than 3%).
6.2 GRMtMAOS as a Model for Global Expansion
Though originally conceived as a domestic settlement solution, GRMtMAOS is highly compatible with international expansion. With a few additions, it can be adapted for cross-border use: • Participating banks in different countries open reciprocal accounts for one another • The network enables multi-currency support and real-time exchange settlement • FX rates are agreed in advance or calculated in real-time between banks • KYC and AML data is exchanged securely via a central management server
For instance, if Bank A in Japan and Bank B in the Philippines establish mutual accounts via GRMtMAOS, they could conduct yen-to-peso transfers directly, bypassing correspondent banks. Benefits include: • Near-instant processing: Settlement within seconds to minutes • Major cost reduction: Fees drop from ~10% to 1–3% • Full transfer visibility: Status updates in real time • Transparent FX: With agreed or market-based rates disclosed upfront
6.3 Comparison with Ripple’s Cross-Border Model
Ripple’s On-Demand Liquidity (ODL) solution also seeks to streamline international remittances, but differs significantly from GRMtMAOS:
Feature
Ripple (ODL)
GRMtMAOS (International)
Transfer currency
Uses XRP as a bridge
Transfers fiat bank deposits directly
FX mechanism
Two-step via XRP
Direct bilateral FX conversion
Volatility
Exposed to XRP price changes
Stable, fiat-based
Regulatory alignment
Varies by jurisdiction
Complies with local banking laws
Risk management
Relies on exchanges and liquidity
Managed via interbank agreements
Target users
Fintech services
General banking customers (B2C, B2B)
Feature Ripple (ODL) GRMtMAOS (International) Transfer currency Uses XRP as a bridge Transfers fiat bank deposits directly FX mechanism Two-step via XRP Direct bilateral FX conversion Volatility Exposed to XRP price changes Stable, fiat-based Regulatory alignment Varies by jurisdiction Complies with local banking laws Risk management Relies on exchanges and liquidity Managed via interbank agreements Target users Fintech services General banking customers (B2C, B2B)
GRMtMAOS’s key strength is its preservation of fiat denomination throughout the transfer, avoiding reliance on crypto-assets and minimizing exposure to price swings and legal ambiguity. Ripple requires fiat → XRP → fiat conversion, while GRMtMAOS moves fiat → fiat directly.
6.4 Foreign Exchange Models and Risk Management
FX handling is a core concern in cross-border payments. GRMtMAOS supports flexible FX strategies, such as: • Pre-agreed fixed rates: Bilaterally agreed exchange rates before initiating the transfer • Real-time market rates: Rates fetched live from FX markets during processing • Net settlement model: Netting out multiple transactions and settling periodically (daily, weekly)
To minimize risk, tools such as FX hedging agreements or pre-offset matching can be implemented. Unlike Ripple’s reliance on market makers and crypto liquidity, GRMtMAOS depends on interbank contractual trust, enabling more stable and controlled FX flows.
6.5 Regional Integration and Strategic Deployment
A realistic strategy for deploying GRMtMAOS internationally would be to begin with Asia and ASEAN countries, where Japan has strong financial ties. Examples include: • Japan → Philippines: worker remittances, component trade • Japan → Bangladesh: technical trainees’ remittances • Japan → Indonesia: tourism and family support payments • Japan → Thailand/Vietnam: intracompany transfers
By implementing GRMtMAOS in these corridors, Japan can build a real-time, low-cost, regulation-aligned payment network and emerge as a central hub for regional financial infrastructure.
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Chapter 7: Legal and Regulatory Alignment
7.1 GRMtMAOS Operates Within Existing Legal Frameworks
Although GRMtMAOS may appear to be a radical innovation, it fully complies with Japan’s current legal system, particularly the Banking Act, the Payment Services Act, and the Currency Act.
GRMtMAOS enables each bank to open reciprocal deposit accounts under other banks’ names and execute internal ledger entries to complete fund transfers. Legally, this falls under the definition of fund transfer services (kawase torihiki) as defined by the following statutes: • Banking Act, Article 4: Permits deposits and funds transfer as core banking operations • Banking Act Enforcement Order, Article 6: Authorizes interbank funds transfer and account clearing • Payment Services Act: Defines electronic means of transferring funds and distinguishes them from prepaid payment instruments
Therefore, GRMtMAOS does not issue new currencies or financial instruments. Instead, it enhances the operational model of existing deposit and transfer mechanisms, allowing implementation without requiring amendments to current laws.
7.2 Legal Differences from E-Money and Stablecoins
Unlike GRMtMAOS, e-money and stablecoins require distinct legal treatment, particularly concerning who issues them and what guarantees their value: • E-money: Issued under the Payment Services Act by fund transfer companies. Prepaid balances are managed by the issuer, with partial protection via trust accounts or deposits, but still subject to issuer risk. • Stablecoins: As of Japan’s 2023 legal revision, may be issued only by licensed banks, trust companies, or approved fund transfer businesses. While typically backed 1:1 with fiat reserves, they still represent private currencies, not legal tender.
In contrast, GRMtMAOS moves bank deposits, which are: • Fully integrated with existing legal tender systems • Covered by deposit insurance (up to statutory limits) • Recognized under the FSA’s regulatory oversight • Compatible with RTGS (Real-Time Gross Settlement) systems operated by central banks
This makes GRMtMAOS one of the most legally robust and reliable models for digital settlement.
7.3 Governance Design for Network Operations
For actual operation, GRMtMAOS requires a well-structured network governance model, including: • Establishing a management server or operating entity (e.g., via a bank consortium) • Setting eligibility criteria for participant banks (capital adequacy, compliance systems, technical readiness) • Defining rules and procedures for transaction limits, credit risk caps, error handling, and dispute resolution • Determining fee structures (e.g., interbank charges, user-side costs) • Monitoring systems for real-time oversight and transaction auditing • Implementing robust BCP (business continuity planning) and failover protocols
Most of these features already exist in current frameworks such as the Zengin System and the Bank of Japan’s RTGS. Therefore, governance adjustments for GRMtMAOS can be modeled on proven domestic systems, optimized for a distributed environment.
7.4 Alignment with Antitrust Law and FSA Guidelines
If banks cooperate to set network fees or operational standards, care must be taken to comply with Japan’s Antimonopoly Act. While coordinated pricing may raise cartel concerns, this can be resolved if the system is structured as public utility infrastructure, similar to: • The Zengin Network • Shared ATM systems • Credit card networks
In such cases, transparent governance under a non-profit framework can justify standardized charges and rules.
Moreover, Japan’s Financial Services Agency (FSA) actively promotes open APIs and next-generation payment infrastructure. GRMtMAOS aligns closely with this policy direction and may be seen as a tool for: • Reclaiming customer relationships from fintech challengers • Enhancing systemic resilience • Improving AML/CFT oversight via centralized monitoring
In short, GRMtMAOS is not only legally compliant, but strategically aligned with Japan’s financial innovation goals.
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Chapter 8: Applications in Public Policy, Welfare, and Emergency Payments
8.1 A National-Scale Payment Infrastructure
GRMtMAOS is not merely a tool for banking efficiency; it has the potential to serve as a critical national infrastructure for public policy. It can be deployed in at least three major areas: 1. Emergency cash disbursement 2. Ongoing public welfare distributions (e.g., Basic Income) 3. Rapid financial assistance during disasters or epidemics
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the delay in distributing relief payments became a national concern, highlighting the need for fast and secure disbursement mechanisms. GRMtMAOS provides a realistic solution to this problem.
8.2 Reforming Emergency Transfers and Government Efficiency
In 2020, the Japanese government’s special ¥100,000 cash relief program was delayed due to manual paperwork, outdated IT systems in local governments, and slow banking processes. It took weeks or even months for some recipients to receive funds.
With GRMtMAOS, the government or municipalities can instantly send payments to eligible residents’ bank accounts via a centralized management server. The process would look like this: 1. Use the Basic Resident Register to compile a list of eligible recipients 2. Generate a bulk payment file combining financial institution codes and account numbers 3. Send commands to each bank via the GRMtMAOS management server 4. Banks immediately execute internal ledger transfers to deposit funds into users’ accounts
Even for millions of recipients, the entire transfer process could be completed within hours, significantly reducing administrative costs and ensuring timely support for citizens.
8.3 Foundation for Basic Income and Targeted Welfare
GRMtMAOS can also support recurring public disbursements such as: • Monthly basic income payments • Welfare, child-rearing support, pension payments • Unemployment benefits or disaster relief funds
Although these are already paid via bank transfers, current systems are still constrained by limited operating hours, manual processing, and system downtime. GRMtMAOS enables automated, real-time distribution and could dramatically increase the efficiency and accuracy of public sector finance.
Moreover, when integrated with identification systems like MyNumber, GRMtMAOS can help prevent duplicate or fraudulent claims and ensure that payments reach the correct recipients.
8.4 Applications in Private-Sector Payroll and Gig Economy
GRMtMAOS is equally useful for the private sector. It can be used for: • Mass salary and bonus disbursements (with real-time reflection) • Instant payments for freelancers and contract workers • Same-day earnings payouts for gig economy platforms (e.g., Uber, food delivery services)
Under current systems, there is often a 1–3 day delay for payments, even after services are completed. GRMtMAOS eliminates that lag. Funds can be deposited within minutes of work completion, improving worker liquidity and enhancing satisfaction.
As employment becomes more flexible and digitalized, the ability to make “real-time payroll a standard” will be critical—and GRMtMAOS is the infrastructure to support it.
8.5 Collaboration with Government Agencies and Future Scalability
To function as a national policy platform, GRMtMAOS must be adopted in collaboration with key government ministries, especially: • The Digital Agency (for ID and system integration) • The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (for resident registers) • The Financial Services Agency (for banking coordination) • The Ministry of Finance (for public fund disbursement mechanisms)
Specifically, GRMtMAOS should be linked with: • MyNumber and the Basic Resident Register • Government budget execution APIs • Local government accounting and treasury systems
Once integrated, GRMtMAOS could digitize the entire public spending workflow, moving Japan closer to real-time fiscal administration.
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Chapter 9: Monetary Sovereignty and Japan’s Strategic Future
9.1 Currency Issuance as the Core of National Sovereignty
Every sovereign nation must issue its own currency and legally designate it as legal tender. This forms the basis for taxation, fiscal spending, and monetary policy. In this sense, monetary sovereignty lies at the very heart of state sovereignty.
With the rise of stablecoins and cryptocurrencies, concerns are growing that national governments could lose control over their monetary systems. This risk becomes especially pronounced when global tech giants issue their own currencies (e.g., Facebook’s former Libra project), potentially creating de facto international currencies not subject to state control.
GRMtMAOS addresses this issue directly by offering a framework that allows legal tender to be digitized and circulated within the boundaries of national law. Unlike private tokens, GRMtMAOS preserves and even strengthens monetary sovereignty by aligning itself with the central bank, the banking system, and financial law.
9.2 The Credibility of the Yen and the Digitalization Dilemma
The Japanese yen remains one of the most trusted currencies in the world. However, Japan lags significantly behind other advanced economies in digitizing its currency and payment infrastructure. Cash usage is still prevalent, and cashless payment ratios trail far behind countries like Korea, China, and the Nordic nations.
Key reasons for this include: • Fragmented e-money systems with poor interoperability • High transaction fees and slow processing in bank transfers • No official decision on issuing a CBDC • A conservative financial infrastructure that resists innovation
GRMtMAOS provides a realistic solution to overcome this institutional stagnation. By leveraging existing bank deposits without creating new tokens or instruments, it allows safe, scalable, and regulated digital currency circulation, preserving trust in the yen while achieving digital transformation.
9.3 Financial Hegemony and International Standardization
Globally, there is an ongoing competition over control of international payment standards. Entities like SWIFT, Ripple, CBDC networks (e.g., mCBDC Bridge), blockchain consortia, and fintech alliances are all vying for influence.
Japan risks becoming a perpetual follower in this race unless it asserts leadership through strategic infrastructure like GRMtMAOS.
To take the lead, Japan must: • Build a network that is legally and technically interoperable internationally • Promote collaboration with ASEAN and APAC nations • Propose a hybrid RTGS + GRMtMAOS model as a global standard • Organize public-private partnerships and inter-ministerial task forces
GRMtMAOS, with its decentralized yet regulated design, offers an ideal platform to serve as Japan’s flagship proposal for next-generation international payment systems.
9.4 Strategic Legal Development and National Policy Integration
If GRMtMAOS is to be adopted as part of Japan’s national economic strategy, the following legal and policy steps should be taken: • Enactment of a GRMtMAOS Basic Act defining participation, governance, and fee policies • Inheritance and bankruptcy provisions to ensure secure transfer of bank deposit-based digital assets • Priority designation for public use cases such as emergency relief and disaster aid • Interoperability framework with a future digital yen (CBDC)
Moreover, GRMtMAOS should be officially designated as a national infrastructure, akin to expressways or water utilities. Oversight and funding should be coordinated by the Digital Agency, the Cabinet Office, and relevant financial authorities.
Its role as a 21st-century backbone for public finance and economic stability cannot be overstated.
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Chapter 10: Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
10.1 Summary: GRMtMAOS as a Practical and Institutional Innovation
This paper has proposed GRMtMAOS (Global Reciprocal Many-to-Many Account Opening System) as a next-generation settlement infrastructure that enhances the mobility of legally issued bank deposits through a real-time, bidirectional network of reciprocal accounts. We examined its technical feasibility, legal compatibility, and socioeconomic implications across public, private, and global domains.
GRMtMAOS addresses multiple challenges simultaneously: • Dramatically lowers the cost and time required for both domestic and international transfers • Corrects the structural disadvantages imposed on merchants by prepaid systems • Enables instant delivery of government subsidies and welfare benefits • Establishes a form of digital legal tender backed by institutional trust • Positions Japan to lead in setting global financial infrastructure standards
What makes GRMtMAOS unique is that it does not seek to create new money. Instead, it reimagines how existing deposit money can be moved more efficiently and transparently. This is a sustainable and realistic path forward that balances innovation with stability.
10.2 Policy Recommendations: A Financial Infrastructure That Can Start Today
To accelerate GRMtMAOS adoption, we recommend the following actions for regulators, central banks, and financial institutions:
(1) Launch pilot projects
Start with proof-of-concept (PoC) trials in specific sectors, such as regional banks or targeted B2B use cases. Prioritize implementations for merchant settlements, disaster relief transfers, or foreign worker remittances.
(2) Establish a management consortium
Form a neutral, non-profit consortium of participating banks to define API specifications, operational policies, risk management standards, and technical governance.
(3) Regulatory and legal support • FSA: Issue guidelines on GRMtMAOS operations within the scope of the Banking Act and Payment Services Act • Ministry of Finance: Recognize GRMtMAOS as a channel for disbursing public funds • Digital Agency / MIC: Facilitate integration with population registries and local government systems • Bank of Japan: Explore interoperability with RTGS and potential future CBDC platforms
(4) Public education and institutional awareness
Raise public understanding of what constitutes digital legal tender, and differentiate it from e-money or crypto-assets. Government and media should cooperate to promote financial literacy in the age of real-time digital cash.
10.3 Final Thoughts: Evolving Within the System, Not Against It
The rise of cryptocurrencies and stablecoins has shown that innovation can quickly outpace regulation, but such developments often lack legal foundations and long-term viability. Sustainable innovation must coexist with, and reinforce, the legal and institutional frameworks of society.
GRMtMAOS represents such an evolution. It allows for high-speed, scalable, and transparent settlement—without sacrificing trust, security, or regulatory oversight. It is innovation not from the outside, but from within the system itself.
Now is the time to build a truly stable and sovereign digital cash economy, one that strengthens monetary trust and aligns with the values of society and law.
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References 1. Kozykozy, T. (2025). The Reciprocal Account Network Remittance System and Its Philosophy. Kozykozy.com. Retrieved from https://kozykozy.com/2025/05/ 2. Financial Services Agency of Japan (2023). Guidelines on Alternative Electronic Payment Instruments (Stablecoin-related). 3. Bank of Japan (2023). Pilot Experiment Report on Central Bank Digital Currency (Phase 2). 4. Bank for International Settlements (2022). Options for Access to and Interoperability of CBDCs. BIS Report. 5. Ripple Labs Inc. (2021). RippleNet Overview & On-Demand Liquidity Technical Whitepaper. 6. Circle Internet Financial (2023). USDC Transparency Report. 7. Financial Services Agency of Japan (2021). Legal Positioning of Electronic Money under the Amended Payment Services Act. 8. World Bank (2024). Remittance Prices Worldwide (Issue 49). 9. International Monetary Fund (2021). The Rise of Digital Money. IMF Working Paper No. WP/21/145. 10. Digital Agency of Japan (2023). Infrastructure Strategy for a Digital Society. 11. SBI Remit Co., Ltd. (2021). Operational Report on International Remittances Using Ripple’s ODL. 12. Wise (formerly TransferWise) (2023). Comparison Report on International and Domestic Remittance Fees. 13. Zengin-Net (2022). Structure and Fee Framework of the Zengin System. 14. Mitsubishi UFJ Trust and Banking Corporation (2024). Progmat Coin Initiative and Implementation of Tokenized Deposits. 15. Financial Services Agency & Ministry of Finance of Japan (2023). Expert Panel Report on the Current State and Future Vision of Domestic Remittance Infrastructure.
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The invention of this “Global Reciprocity Many-to-Many Account Opening System (GRMtMAOS)” was invented by the singing inventor kozykozy (M. Takashi).Thank you for viewing
上記の懸念を踏まえ、GRMtMAOSと呼ばれる法定通貨ベースの国際送金モデルとの比較分析を行います。ここでGRMtMAOSモデルとは、各国の法定通貨を直接用いて国際送金を行う新しい枠組みを指します(発明人である'歌うkozykozy'氏が名付けた仮想のモデル名です)。要するに、中間に暗号資産を介さず法定通貨同士を繋ぐことで送金する仕組みと考えてください。このモデルは、XRP利用時に指摘されたボラティリティや規制・主権上のリスクを低減することを目指しています。それぞれの観点について、Ripple(XRP)方式と対比しながら見ていきます。 ① ボラティリティリスクの排除(法定通貨ベース): GRMtMAOSモデルでは送金の媒介として各国の法定通貨(あるいはそのデジタル版)を用います。例えば送金元の通貨Aを直接送金先の通貨Bに交換・送付するイメージであり、その間に価値が暗号資産に依存して乱高下することはありません。為替レートの変動リスクは従来どおり存在しますが、それは国際送金一般に内在する通常の為替リスクであり、送金時点で同時交換することで最小化できます。一方、Ripple方式では自国通貨を一旦XRPという第三の通貨に交換し、受取側で再度自国通貨に戻すプロセスが入るため、その往復の間にXRP価格が変動する可能性がありました。本モデルではそのプロセス自体が不要となるため、追加的な価格変動リスクは原理的に発生しません。結果として、送金額の価値が送金中に目減りしたり増えたりする不確実性が排除され、送金者・受取者双方にとって安心感が高まります。特に大口送金や企業の資金移動では、為替ヘッジの計画が立てやすくなる利点があります。要約すれば、GRMtMAOSモデルは法定通貨ベースで動くため価値安定性が確保されており、XRP方式に付きまとっていたボラティリティリスクを構造的に取り除いています。
② 規制親和性と制度整合性: 法定通貨を使うこのモデルは、既存の金融規制や制度との親和性が高い点が特徴です。送金に用いるのが各国の公式な通貨である以上、新たに「これは証券か通貨か」といった法的解釈の問題が生じにくく、法制度の枠内で運用できます。各国の中央銀行や金融当局も、自国通貨建ての取引であれば現在の銀行間決済網や外為法制の延長線上で管理・監督が可能です。例えば、送金メッセージの標準はSWIFTのISO20022を使い、実際の資金移動は各国の即時決済システムを国際接続する、といった形であれば、技術的革新はありつつも制度上は従来の延長で理解できます。これに対しXRPを介したモデルでは、暗号資産特有のカストディやKYC/AML(本人確認・マネロン対策)の問題など、新しい規制対応を求められる部分がありました。GRMtMAOSモデルでは基本的に銀行など既存プレーヤーが法定通貨をやり取りするため、KYC/AMLも現行の枠組みを強化・応用する形で制度整合性を保てます。また、各国政府・規制当局にとって受け入れやすいモデルでもあります。暗号資産に対する根本的な不信(価格不安定や匿名利用の懸念等)を避け、既存通貨のデジタル化・連携という位置付けであれば、政策的な障壁が低いと考えられます。要するに、本モデルは「新たな通貨」を生み出すのではなく「既存の通貨システムを接続する」アプローチであり、ルール作りや国際協調も既存の延長線上で進めやすい利点があります。
③ 国家主権通貨を維持したままの国際接続モデル: GRMtMAOSの最大の強みは、各国が自国の法定通貨主権を維持したまま国際送金ネットワークを構築できる点です。送金の媒介として使われるのは各国の通貨そのもの、あるいは各国中央銀行が発行するデジタル通貨(CBDC)であり、各国は自国通貨の発行量・金利政策など主権的コントロールを従来通り行えます。前述のように民間の第三通貨に依存する場合に懸念された通貨主権の侵食や地政学リスクが、このモデルでは最小化されています。国際接続部分のガバナンスについても、各国中央銀行や国際機関の協調によって管理するなど、マルチステークホルダー型の運営が可能です。これは、一企業が主導するRippleネットワークに比べて政治的中立性・持続性の観点で優れていると評価されるでしょう。また、自国通貨を介して接続する形であれば、仮に特定の国がネットワークから離脱しても他国の通貨価値には直接影響を与えませんし、各国が段階的に参加・非参加を調整しやすい柔軟性もあります。端的に言えば、GRMtMAOSモデルは**「各国の通貨のまま、お互いを繋ぐ」**ことでグローバルな送金を実現するものです。これは各国にとって主権を守りつつ国際協調メリットを享受できる形であり、政治的な受容性が高いアプローチといえます。
A paradigm shift in domestic and international remittances through the Global Reciprocity Account Opening System (GRMtMAOS) (May 4, 2025 version)
Chapter 1: Abstract
In this paper, taking into account the limitations of the current domestic and international remittance infrastructure and alternative remittance methods by FinTech companies, we consider the theoretical structure of the newly proposed Global Reciprocity Account Opening System (GRMtMAOS) and the paradigm shift it will bring about in bank remittance infrastructure.
The Global Reciprocity Many-to-Many Account Opening System (GRMtMAOS) is a decentralized network that enables real-time and cost-efficient remittances by allowing banks to open deposit accounts in each other's names without going through a centralized infrastructure such as the All-Banks Network.
The introduction of this system is expected to dramatically reduce remittance costs, return foreign exchange operations to banks, improve anti-money laundering measures, and simplify procedures for reversing erroneous transfers.
In addition, as a core technology for directly converting legal tender into digital cash and circulating it without the need for traditional cryptocurrencies or stablecoins, GRMtMAOS has the potential to become the cornerstone of financial infrastructure innovation for the next 100 years.
The features of GRMtMAOS, "equality between banks" and "digital native currency," are also attracting attention in policy trends in various countries. For example, decentralized and highly instantaneous remittance systems are being promoted in various countries, such as the interconnection of Singapore's "PayNow" and Thailand's "PromptPay," and the introduction of India's "UPI (Unified Payments Interface)."
These examples are consistent with the philosophy of GRMtMAOS and serve as references for international benchmarks.
Furthermore, according to a World Bank report, the global average remittance cost in 2022 will be about 6.5%, and this ratio will be even higher, especially for remittances to developing countries. The introduction of GRMtMAOS is expected to significantly reduce these costs and contribute to promoting financial inclusion.
This paper shows the direction of the next-generation remittance infrastructure through a detailed configuration of the proposed system, its technical features, a comparative analysis with conventional methods, and verification of the implementation effects.
Chapter 2: Introduction
For many years, funds transfers (foreign exchange operations) by banks have relied on centralized settlement infrastructures such as the Zengin Network and SWIFT. In Japan, interbank remittances are settled by transferring funds between current accounts at the Bank of Japan via the Zengin Net.
In recent years, new remittance services provided by FinTech companies such as PayPal and Wise have emerged, providing instant and inexpensive methods of remittance without going through banks, but scalability issues remain, such as the need to pool pre-funds and dependency on relay networks.
Against this background, this paper proposes the "Reciprocal Account Network Remittance System (GRMtMAOS)," which aims to provide a more efficient and flexible next-generation remittance infrastructure through a decentralized structure and many-to-many account model.
GRMtMAOS is a mechanism that can complete two-way and instantaneous fund settlement without going through a centralized clearinghouse, while still being based on fiat currency. This not only improves convenience for users, but also reduces operational costs and legal risks for financial institutions.
This chapter provides an introductory overview of the structural constraints and limitations of traditional infrastructure, as well as the technical features of FinTech schemes, and then outlines how GRMtMAOS can overcome these.
Chapter 3: Related Work
3.1 Domestic remittances: Structure and constraints of Zengin-Net
Zengin-Net, the core of Japan's interbank remittance infrastructure, is a centralized network centered on the Bank of Japan, to which all commercial banks are connected. While this system has high reliability and security, it has high operating costs and issues with immediacy and flexibility remain, such as operation only during the day on weekdays and not available at night or on holidays.
3.2 International remittances: Issues with the SWIFT network
When it comes to international remittances, the SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) network functions as the de facto international standard. However, in reality, it is structured to go through multiple correspondent banks (intermediary banks), and remittances usually take 1 to 3 business days, and fees tend to be high and unclear. Furthermore, remittance routes tend to become black boxes, making it difficult to respond when mistransfers or financial problems occur.
3.3 FinTech alternatives
Recently, FinTech companies such as PayPal, Wise, and Revolut offer services with benefits such as instant remittance, low fees, and app integration. Many of these adopt a "local settlement" model that utilizes pre-funded pools, and while they can provide a certain degree of immediacy, they have limitations in scalability, consistency with fiat currencies, credit structures, etc. In many cases, they are unsuitable for large-scale payments or cross-border financial operations.
3.4 Impact of International Regulations and the Travel Rule
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has established the Travel Rule to strengthen transparency and AML (Anti-Money Laundering) in international remittances. This makes it mandatory to provide detailed information on remittance senders and recipients. While this in itself increases transparency, it has also created new problems such as incompatibility between different systems and the complexity of complying with regulations across borders.
Chapter 4: Comparative Analysis with International Remittance Systems
4.1 Comparison: PayNow, PromptPay, UPI Singapore's PayNow and Thailand's PromptPay launched interconnections for two-way instant remittances in 2021, enabling real-time payments by linking bank accounts and mobile numbers. India's UPI (Unified Payments Interface) is a pioneering example that integrates multiple banks and services through an API-based open platform to enable instant P2P and B2B payments.
4.2 Analysis of Similarities
All of these systems share ideological commonality with GRMtMAOS, with features such as immediacy, low fees, smartphone compatibility, state-led governance structures, and linkage with financial services through open APIs.
4.3 Advantages of GRMtMAOS
• It does not require a central relay agency and has excellent scalability and fault tolerance as a distributed network.
• It does not require a pre-fund pool and has an “on-demand” feature where funds are transferred only at the time of transfer.
• A direct transfer method using account balances between banks allows for optimization of fund liquidity and instant settlement.
• Blockchain technology is applied to message communication, ensuring compatibility with ISO 20022.
4.5 Consideration of the results of the comparison of PayNow, PromptPay, and UPI
Advanced systems such as PayNow, PromptPay, and UPI have an excellent track record in domestic remittances and some international collaboration, and serve as design references for GRMtMAOS. However, all of them are centralized structures or API-based relay types, and cannot fully meet future requirements such as many-to-many direct interbank connections, direct transfer of fiat currency, and non-stop operation.
GRMtMAOS is an architecture that enables safe and instantaneous remittances without the need for currency conversion or relaying by opening mutual accounts on a reciprocal basis, and has a high potential for widespread adoption as an international standard.
4.6 Latest trends in international remittances using RippleNet and XRP (as of April 2025)
4.6.1. 1. Structure of RippleNet and the role of XRP RippleNet is a network that utilizes blockchain technology to enable international remittances between financial institutions in real time and at low cost. While traditional interbank remittances go through intermediary banks and nostro accounts, RippleNet uses standardized APIs and a distributed ledger (XRP Ledger) to enable direct and seamless transfer of funds. XRP is used as a bridge currency to bridge the source and destination currencies in the on-demand liquidity (ODL) service on RippleNet. This eliminates the need to pool huge amounts of funds in advance in each country, and shortens the time required for international remittances to a few seconds to a few minutes.
4.6.2. XRP remittance process
1. Converting source currency to XRP
The sending financial institution converts its home currency to XRP in real time.
2. Sending XRP
The XRP is sent to the recipient on the XRP Ledger.
3. Converting XRP back to local currency
The receiving financial institution immediately converts the received XRP into local currency.
4. Final transfer of funds
The local currency is deposited into the recipient's account and the remittance is complete.
This process allows for quick settlement without the need for an intermediary bank.
4.7 Evaluation of safety and convenience (comparison items)
4.8.1. Examine the risks of Ripple in detail, particularly the crypto asset bridge XRP.
4.8 2. Risk assessment: double volatility and mitigation measures By using XRP, the following exchange rate fluctuation risks may occur twice:
• Between the source currency and XRP
• Between XRP and the destination currency
Although risk is minimized by limiting holding time to a few seconds, slippage remains a concern for large transactions.
Risk mitigation measures and regulatory responses • Restrictions on long-term XRP holding (BIS standard: capital ratio cap of 1%) • Settlement with SEC (2024) mitigates legal risks • Strengthened decentralization with introduction of Ripple Liquidity Hub and RLUSD (stable coin) • Partnership with SBI expands number of countries where ODL is available to more than 20
4.8.3. Statistical Support and Market Trends When analyzing the actual implementation of RippleNet, statistical support such as the distribution of connected banks, changes in ODL liquidity, and correlation coefficients with local currencies is important. In addition, supplementing the price fluctuation range and spread of XRP with actual data will make the risk assessment more convincing. For example, the price of XRP as of April 2025 is about $2.20, and the price fluctuation rate over the past 30 days is reported to be about 5%. In addition, RippleNet works with more than 300 financial institutions around the world and is deployed in more than 40 countries. As mentioned above, RippleNet and XRP provide innovative technology and services in the field of international remittances.
4.8.4. Concerns about international remittances using Ripple and comparative analysis with alternative methods
Ripple, which is attracting attention as an international remittance platform, and its currency, XRP, have innovative advantages, but some potential and actual risks and concerns have been pointed out. In this paper, we will analyze the main concerns about remittances via XRP from various angles, and compare them with a fiat-based alternative model (tentatively called the "GRMtMAOS" model) based on these concerns. We will also briefly compare the differences with central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) and stable coins, and summarize the advantages and disadvantages of each. We will explain as simply and logically as possible so that it can be understood by those in the financial industry, general consumers, and policy makers.
4.8.5.XRP price volatility and its impact on remittance stability
4.8.5.1.The magnitude of XRP price fluctuations (volatility) is an unavoidable point when talking about Ripple's international remittance solution. In general, cryptocurrencies fluctuate more dramatically than fiat currencies, and XRP is no exception. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) also points out that "cryptocurrencies are extremely unstable in value and are almost useless as a measure of value or a means of storing value," and sudden price fluctuations are a factor that impairs their practicality as a currency.
On the other hand, Ripple claims that the volatility risk during remittances can be minimized. In Ripple's solution (ODL: On-Demand Liquidity), which uses XRP as a bridge currency, the holding time of XRP is extremely short, about a few seconds, and the risk of price fluctuations during that time is negligible. In fact, a test published by Ripple concluded that the price fluctuation range during international remittances using XRP is at most about 8% compared to the conventional method of remittance of only fiat currency via SWIFT, which is less than one-tenth of the volatility of the conventional method. This shows that the fluctuation range of XRP remittances, which are completed in a few seconds, is smaller than the exchange rate fluctuations that occur in a fiat currency remittance, which takes three business days, for example.
However, this does not mean that the volatility risk is zero. The cryptocurrency market is constantly fluctuating, and depending on the timing of remittance, the price may move in seconds. In theory, there is a risk that the price of XRP may suddenly drop or rise during remittance, which can be a significant source of anxiety for senders and recipients, especially when transferring large amounts. In addition, if a delay occurs in the exchange of XRP due to technical problems in the remittance infrastructure or exchange, and a transaction that should be completed in a few seconds is prolonged, the risk of price fluctuation during that time increases. In fact, the market price of XRP can fluctuate by double digits in a day due to regulatory news and speculative movements, and such uncertainty casts a shadow on the stability of remittances. From the above, it can be said that although the impact of volatility is small when transferring remittances using XRP because it is faster than conventional methods, concerns about stability cannot be completely eliminated due to the structure that involves "cryptocurrency whose price may fluctuate."
4.8.5.2. International and national regulatory environment and the impact of changes in systems
The trends of regulatory authorities are also a factor that will greatly affect the future of XRP remittances. Internationally, legal regulations regarding cryptocurrencies are still being developed, and responses vary by country and region. The largest regulatory case involving Ripple and XRP was a lawsuit by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In 2020, the SEC filed a lawsuit alleging that Ripple's sales of XRP constituted the illegal provision of unregistered securities, leading to a long-term legal battle. In July 2023, a U.S. district court ruled that "XRP itself is not a security," but the specific sales form by Ripple executives still required legal verification, and the SEC temporarily showed an attitude of appealing (the district court judge dismissed the appeal in October of the same year). However, the case has not been completely resolved, and some disputes, such as those regarding the amount of fines, are still ongoing in 2024. This legal uncertainty posed a major risk to companies using XRP. In fact, MoneyGram, a major US remittance company, has taken measures to suspend the use of Ripple's solutions due to the uncertainty caused by the SEC lawsuit. As such, there are cases where partner companies are forced to withdraw from remittance networks depending on the decision of the regulatory authorities.
Looking at other countries, the regulatory environment is mixed. In relatively crypto-friendly countries such as Japan and Singapore, the position is taken that XRP is registered and managed as a "crypto asset" and does not fall under securities, and there are cases where bank subsidiaries are developing remittance services using Ripple's technology. The Dubai Monetary Authority in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) also officially approved the use of XRP in November 2023, allowing companies in the country's international financial center to freely handle XRP in their services. The background to this is reportedly because XRP is a useful currency specialized for remittances and has a high global reputation. On the other hand, the European Union (EU) is trying to introduce a comprehensive regulatory framework for crypto assets in general by enacting the MiCA regulation, and in the future, existing tokens including XRP may be subject to new compliance requirements, such as issuer information disclosure and reserve regulations for stable coins. If regulations are strengthened in each country, additional procedures such as obtaining licenses and reporting to authorities will be required when using XRP as an international remittance infrastructure, which may affect convenience and costs.
In short, the regulatory environment surrounding XRP is fluid, and changes in it will directly affect its use for remittance. If regulations become clearer and more friendly, it will lead to increased use, but conversely, if regulatory risks increase, companies will be cautious about adopting it. In particular, if the legal status is unstable in a large market like the United States, it will be a hurdle to widely adopt it as a global standard. If crypto assets are introduced into the international remittance business, the burden of closely monitoring and adapting to the latest trends in each country's legal system is a major challenge.
4.8.5.3. Geopolitical risks from the perspective of national currency sovereignty
When considering international remittances by Ripple from the perspective of national currency sovereignty, another concern emerges. Leaving the "standard" of international remittances to private crypto assets such as XRP could affect the ability of each country to control the value and circulation of its own currency. As an extreme example, if residents of a country were to routinely remit and store value via XRP instead of their own currency, that country's currency would lose some of its functionality and the effectiveness of monetary policy would be diminished. This situation can be likened to "dollarization," in which the dominance of a country's currency is undermined by the circulation of other countries' currencies, and can be called "XRPification." In reality, the remitted XRP is ultimately converted into the recipient's legal tender, so the settlement unit of the domestic economy is not directly replaced by XRP. However, central banks and fiscal authorities may feel that their sovereignty is being eroded by using a third private currency instead of the national currency on the remittance route.
Another geopolitical risk is the issue of control over the international remittance network. Currently, international remittances are run by a multinational cooperative system centered on SWIFT, but if RippleNet (XRP ledger) were to take over that role, Ripple, which provides the infrastructure, and XRP holders would become the hub of international remittances. Ripple is an American company and holds a large amount of XRP. From the perspective of each country, there may be a sense of caution about relying on a currency infrastructure in which a single company is deeply involved in issuing and managing it. In particular, the fact that networks that cannot be fully controlled by national governments become mainstream in terms of sanctions and anti-money laundering measures will be linked to security concerns. However, the XRP ledger itself is an open, distributed technology, and no specific government can directly control transactions (the same can be said for SWIFT). However, from the perspective of each government, there is a strong desire to maintain the framework for international transactions in their own currencies, and they have no choice but to be cautious about the rise of a private-sector-led global currency. In summary, the geopolitical risks of XRP transfers can be summarized as "dilution of monetary sovereignty" and "dependence on the private sector for international remittance infrastructure." It has been pointed out that for each country to promote international cooperation while protecting its own monetary system, a method that does not rely on a third currency such as XRP is more politically acceptable. This point will be an important point of discussion when comparing alternative models, which will be discussed later.
4.8.6.Legal and technical limitations and risks of Ripple (XRP) remittance methods
Legal limitations include the aforementioned regulatory uncertainty, as well as the difficulty of handling XRP because it is not a legal currency. For example, there are areas where no precedents have been accumulated, such as how to legally evaluate credits and liabilities in XRP when a dispute arises during remittance, or issues with tax treatment associated with remittances (such as capital gains taxation). In addition, there may be cases where it is unclear whether XRP remittances fall under each country's capital regulations (foreign remittance limits and reporting obligations). From a legal and institutional perspective, there are gray areas remaining because it is a framework that is different from traditional bank remittances, and there are some areas where users and businesses have no choice but to deal with it at their own risk.
Technical risks and limitations will also be mentioned. The XRP ledger (XRPL) achieves high-speed settlements through its unique consensus algorithm, but there is debate about its decentralization and reliability. Unlike Bitcoin, where many miners compete to verify transactions, XRPL is designed to form a consensus based on a pre-defined list of trusted validators (Unique Node List, UNL). Anyone can operate a validator (verification node), but the "trusted nodes" that can directly participate in transactions are essentially those selected and recommended by Ripple and its partners. For this reason, some have criticized it as a centralized network that operates under the control of Ripple. The concentration of XRP supply has also been pointed out. Ripple still holds a large amount of XRP and continues to have influence on the market. In fact, Ripple is still the largest holder of XRP, which has led to concerns that "price manipulation may be possible." However, most of the company's holdings are locked in escrow (a trust account), and there is also a limit of up to 1 billion XRP that can be released and sold per month. Although efforts are being made to level out the impact on the market with this mechanism, there are still some who are concerned about the centralization of supply.
In addition, the scalability and interoperability of the XRP ledger must also be considered. The processing performance itself is high, capable of processing about 1,500 transactions per second, but if it is to be used worldwide as a standard infrastructure for international remittances, it will need to withstand a larger volume of transactions than it currently does. In addition, the cost of building a connection interface with existing bank accounting systems and payment networks cannot be ignored. For banks to introduce XRP, they will need to custody crypto assets, collaborate with exchanges, and modify their systems. Even if it is technically feasible, the effort required to integrate with legacy systems may be a barrier to widespread adoption.
In general, remittances using Ripple are technically attractive for their high speed and low cost, but they have issues with reliability (centralization risk), delayed legal development, and compatibility with existing systems. How to overcome these limitations will be the key to wider adoption in the future.
4.8.7. Comparison with the GRMtMAOS model in light of concerns
In light of the above concerns, we will conduct a comparative analysis with a fiat-based international remittance model called GRMtMAOS. The GRMtMAOS model refers to a new framework for international remittances that directly use each country's fiat currency (the name of the hypothetical model was given by the inventor, 'Uta Kozykozy'). In short, think of it as a mechanism for remittances by connecting fiat currencies without using crypto assets in between. This model aims to reduce the volatility and regulatory/sovereign risks that have been pointed out when using XRP. We will look at each perspective in comparison with the Ripple (XRP) method. • ① Elimination of volatility risk (fiat currency-based): The GRMtMAOS model uses each country's fiat currency (or its digital version) as a medium for remittances. For example, the image is that the remittance source currency A is directly exchanged and sent to the remittance destination currency B, and the value does not fluctuate wildly depending on the crypto asset during that time. Although the risk of exchange rate fluctuations still exists, it is a normal exchange risk inherent in international remittances in general, and can be minimized by exchanging at the time of remittance. On the other hand, in the Ripple method, the domestic currency is first exchanged into a third currency called XRP, and then the process of converting it back to the domestic currency on the receiving side is included, so the price of XRP may fluctuate during that round trip. In this model, the process itself is unnecessary, so in principle, there is no additional price fluctuation risk. As a result, the uncertainty of the value of the remittance amount decreasing or increasing during the remittance is eliminated, and both the sender and the recipient feel more secure. In particular, for large remittances and corporate fund transfers, it has the advantage of making it easier to plan exchange rate hedging. In summary, the GRMtMAOS model operates on a fiat currency basis, ensuring value stability, and structurally removing the volatility risk that was associated with the XRP method.
• ② Regulatory compatibility and system consistency: This model using legal currency is characterized by its high compatibility with existing financial regulations and systems. Since the official currency of each country is used for remittance, new legal interpretation issues such as "is this a security or a currency" are unlikely to arise, and it can be operated within the framework of the legal system. Central banks and financial authorities of each country can also manage and supervise transactions denominated in their own currency as an extension of the current interbank settlement network and foreign exchange laws. For example, if the standard for remittance messages is SWIFT's ISO20022, and the actual transfer of funds is an international connection of each country's real-time settlement system, then while there is technological innovation, the system can be understood as an extension of the past. In contrast, the model using XRP required new regulatory responses, such as custody and KYC/AML (identification and anti-money laundering) issues specific to crypto assets. In the GRMtMAOS model, existing players such as banks basically exchange legal currency, so KYC/AML can maintain system consistency by strengthening and applying the current framework. It is also a model that is easy for governments and regulatory authorities to accept. If it avoids the fundamental distrust of cryptocurrencies (such as concerns about price instability and anonymous use) and is positioned as a way to digitize and link existing currencies, the policy barriers are thought to be low. In short, this model is an approach that does not create a "new currency" but rather "connects existing monetary systems," which has the advantage that rule-making and international cooperation can be easily carried out along existing lines.
③ International connection model while maintaining national sovereign currency: The greatest strength of GRMtMAOS is that each country can build an international remittance network while maintaining its own legal tender sovereignty. The transfer medium is the currency of each country itself, or a digital currency (CBDC) issued by each country's central bank, and each country can continue to exercise sovereign control over its own currency, such as the amount of issuance and interest rate policy. As mentioned above, this model minimizes the erosion of currency sovereignty and geopolitical risks that were a concern when relying on private third currencies. The governance of the international connection part can also be managed through cooperation between central banks and international organizations, making it possible to operate in a multi-stakeholder manner. This will be evaluated as being superior in terms of political neutrality and sustainability compared to the Ripple network led by a single company. In addition, if the connection is made through the domestic currency, even if a specific country withdraws from the network, it will not directly affect the currency value of other countries, and there is also the flexibility to make it easy for each country to adjust its participation and non-participation in stages. In short, the GRMtMAOS model enables global remittances by "connecting countries while keeping their currencies the same." This allows each country to enjoy the benefits of international cooperation while protecting its sovereignty, making it an approach that is highly politically acceptable.
As mentioned above, the GRMtMAOS model has advantageous characteristics in terms of volatility risk, regulatory compliance, and currency sovereignty compared to the Ripple (XRP) method. However, strong cooperation between countries and standardization of technical infrastructure are essential to realize this, and there are hurdles to practical use (such as the time and cost required to build a new international network). Nevertheless, some experts say that this approach is more likely to be accepted by the mainstream financial system in the long term because it does not involve crypto assets. In fact, a project led by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and others is conducting settlement experiments linking the CBDCs of multiple countries, and is exploring ways to improve the efficiency of international remittances by directly bridging between fiat currencies. In the future, such fiat currency-based models may develop in competition with or coexist with the Ripple method.
4.8.8. Comparison with CBDC and stable coins, advantages and disadvantages
Finally, we will briefly summarize the characteristics, advantages and disadvantages of central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) and stable coins, which are often discussed in conjunction with Ripple/XRP and the above models. All of these are potential means of international remittances, and each has its own advantages and challenges. • Stable coins: (e.g., privately issued coins with value pegged to legal tender, such as USDT and USDC) Advantages: Since the value is pegged 1:1 to legal tender, the price is stable and the intense volatility unique to crypto assets can be avoided. Since it is issued and circulated on the blockchain, it is possible to make instant transfers 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, and it can be used for international remittances at low cost without geographical restrictions. Major stable coins (such as USDT) that already have a large circulation amount also have high liquidity and are beginning to be widely accepted as a means of payment for cryptocurrency transactions and some international commercial transactions. Disadvantages: The biggest challenge is that it contains credit risk. Stablecoins are backed by legal currency or assets held by issuers (private companies) to guarantee their value, but if the issuer goes bankrupt or the reserve assets are damaged, the peg may collapse and the value of the coin may not be able to be maintained. In fact, in the past, there have been cases where 1USDT < 1USD due to the lack of transparency in the reserve proof, and there have also been collapses of algorithmic stablecoins (UST example). In addition, regulatory authorities in various countries are considering strict regulations on stablecoins while considering them as private currencies similar to electronic money, and in some countries there are moves to impose restrictions on their issuance and distribution. Since they are not legal tender themselves, the finality of payments depends on the trust of the issuing company, and there is no public safety net. From the above, stablecoins are promising in that they have a "stable value" and can be used flexibly, but they need to overcome the challenges of reliability and regulation. • Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC): (e.g., legal tender digital currencies issued by central banks in various countries, such as the digital yuan and digital dollar concept)
Advantages: It is an official digital currency issued directly by the central bank, and has the same value and legal status as legal tender. Since the price is the legal tender of the country itself, there is zero risk of fluctuation, and it is backed by the credit of the country. Since it is a central bank debt as a settlement fund, it is publicly guaranteed and extremely reliable. It is expected to contribute to the efficiency of domestic payment systems and financial inclusion (provision of services to people without bank accounts), and if CBDCs of each country are directly connected, it may be possible to realize instant and low-cost international remittances. Currently, 11 countries, including Nigeria and the Bahamas, have officially introduced CBDCs, and it is reported that more than 50 other countries and regions are considering and demonstrating issuance. If it becomes an international standard, a safe and efficient cross-border payment infrastructure will be built through a public digital currency network.
Disadvantages: Implementation costs and time are required, as well as privacy and political issues. CBDC requires financial system reforms specific to each country, so it will take many years and a large investment to design, demonstrate, and deploy. In particular, agreements and technical standardization between countries are essential for interoperability in international remittances, and adjustments will take time. In addition, because it is a centralized digital currency, transactions are easily tracked by authorities, which can lead to public concerns and political debate that "government surveillance will be strengthened." Commercial banks are also wary of central bank money being directly distributed to individuals, so it is necessary to reconcile the interests of stakeholders. In addition, it has been pointed out that, unlike cash, if technical failures or cyber attacks occur, there is a risk that system downtime will have a direct impact on the economy. Although CBDC is state-led and highly reliable, there are many hurdles to overcome in order to realize and operate it.
To summarize the above, the model using Ripple (XRP) presented a market-driven innovative solution to existing issues (slow remittances and costs), but it came with challenges such as volatility, regulatory compliance, and sovereignty risks. On the other hand, the GRMtMAOS model and CBDC excel in stability and regulatory compatibility, but require coordination costs and technological development to implement. Stablecoins have already achieved a certain degree of success on a private basis, but the challenge for the future is to raise their reliability to the same level as central bank money. Each has its pros and cons, but ultimately the key is how to balance "fast and cheap remittances" with "stable and reliable value."
4.8.9. Summary (GRMtMAOS is the best)
International remittance using Ripple's XRP has shown great technological advances in transaction immediacy and cost efficiency compared to traditional bank remittance networks. However, on the other hand, it has become clear that there are risk factors that cannot be overlooked before widely adopting crypto assets as financial infrastructure, such as volatility specific to crypto assets, opaque legal status, impact on national monetary sovereignty, and technical centralization.
CBDCs (Central Bank Digital Currencies) are also state-led and highly stable, but due to the nature of being developed and operated in each country, there are still challenges in global instant connectivity and interoperability. In addition, although stable coins are attracting attention in terms of liquidity and technological innovation, there are still hurdles to be overcome in terms of final credibility as a currency, such as credit concentration in private issuers and regulatory uncertainty.
International remittance using Ripple's XRP has shown great technological advances in transaction immediacy and cost efficiency compared to traditional bank remittance networks. However, it has also become clear that there are risk factors that cannot be overlooked before crypto assets can be widely adopted as financial infrastructure, such as their volatility, the lack of transparency of their legal status, their impact on national monetary sovereignty, and technical centralization.
In response to this, the Global Reciprocity Many-to-Many Account Opening System (GRMtMAOS) is a model that combines extremely high institutional and technical stability, with a structure that allows instant and mutual transfer of legal tender without the need for crypto assets, and meets the three major requirements of eliminating volatility, being consistent with existing legal systems, and maintaining national sovereignty.
CBDCs (Central Bank Digital Currencies) are also state-led and highly stable, but due to the nature of being developed and operated in each country, there are still issues remaining in terms of global instant connectivity and interoperability. In addition, although stable coins are attracting attention in terms of liquidity and technological innovation, there are still hurdles to be overcome before they can be ultimately trusted as a currency, such as the concentration of credit in private issuers and regulatory uncertainty.
Considering these factors, GRMtMAOS bridges the gap between private technology and the public financial system, and presents the most rational and realistic blueprint for an international remittance infrastructure for financial authorities, banks, companies, and users in general. It achieves a high level of volatility risk avoidance, instantaneous and transparent remittances, and adaptability to international regulations, and can be concluded to be the model closest to the optimal solution at present.
It is still unclear which method future international remittance infrastructure will converge upon, but it is highly likely that GRMtMAOS will play a central role as a platform that combines the advantages of each method while maintaining the most stable balance between system and implementation.
References and sources: The data and statements referred to in this article are based on reliable public information, such as Ripple's official verification results [12], the views of international organizations such as the IMF [15], analyses by media outlets [10] [28], and articles in industry media [32]. In addition, for technical explanations and statistics on stablecoins and CBDCs, we referred to commentaries by experts [24] [21]. Each source is indicated where appropriate.
Chapter 5: Architecture & Technical Design of GRMtMAOS
5.1 Many-to-Many Reciprocal Deposit Account Model
GRMtMAOS achieves many-to-many bidirectional connections by allowing banks to open mutual deposit accounts (reciprocal accounts) in each other's names. This structure allows each remittance transaction to be completed by internal transfers within each bank without going through a central intermediary (Zengin Net, SWIFT, etc.).
This model is positioned as an evolution of the traditional nostro/vostro account model, and enables both local management of funds and global remittances.
5.2 Standard procedure for remittance processing in GRMtMAOS (structure flow)
The following is the standard procedure for when customer X of sending bank A remits 200 million yen to customer Y of receiving bank B:
1. Receipt of remittance instruction:
• Customer X submits a remittance instruction to Bank A.
2. Transfer and lock of funds within the sending bank:
• 200 million yen is withdrawn from X's account and transferred to an account in Bank A under the name of Bank B.
• The funds are immediately locked.
3. Notification of remittance instruction:
• Bank A sends a remittance instruction to Bank B.
4. Provisional deposit and locking at the receiving bank:
• Bank B makes a provisional deposit to Y's account and temporarily locks the amount.
5. Notification of lock completion and synchronous confirmation:
• Bank B notifies Bank A of the completion of the lock.
• Bank A receives the notification and confirms the completion of the mutual lock.
6. Unlocking and payment completion:
• Bank A releases the lock and officially transfers the funds to Bank B.
• Bank B also unlocks account Y and the transfer is complete.
7. Timeout response:
• If Bank B does not return a lock notification within a certain period of time, Bank A cancels the transaction and returns the funds to X's account.
This series of processes is composed of an "atomic transaction", which leaves no partial processing state and is automatically rewound in the event of a failure.
5.3 Technical configuration and operational requirements • Remittance management server that relays APIs, monitors messages, and manages KYC • Decentralized P2P communication protocol by each bank node • Ensuring consistency with ISO 20022 message standards • Message design using non-asset tokens (blockchain integration design) • Smart contract-based conditional instruction processing (optional)
5.4 Handling Reversals and Misdirected Transfers
GRMtMAOS allows you to cancel a transaction at any time in the "locked state" before the remittance is confirmed. This allows for immediate response to errors before the remittance, such as incorrect account numbers or recipient mismatches.
Even after the settlement is confirmed, reverse processing through a reciprocal account allows funds to be quickly rewound with the cooperation of the other bank, significantly reducing the effort and risk involved in reversing a transaction.
Chapter 6: Simulation & Impact Assessment
6.1 Case Study: 200 Million Yen Remittance
Assuming that a customer X of Bank A remits 200 million yen to a customer Y of Bank B, the processing procedure when using GRMtMAOS is as follows:
• Immediately transfer and lock 200 million yen from X's account to a reciprocal account in Bank B's name within Bank A.
• Bank A notifies Bank B of a remittance instruction message.
• Bank B deposits 200 million yen provisionally into Y's account and locks it.
• After confirming that the lock has been completed between the two banks, the lock is released at the same time and the remittance is confirmed.
• The process takes less than a few seconds and does not require any intermediate institutions (Zengin Net, Bank of Japan, SWIFT).
6.2 Comparison with conventional methods
6.3 Possibility of Cross-Border Expansion
For example, if Bank A in Japan and Bank C in the United States have mutual accounts, in a scenario where depositor X of Bank A transfers 500 million yen to customer Y of Bank C, the process will be as follows:
1. Processing at Bank A: Bank A withdraws 500 million yen from Mr. X's account and transfers the funds to a yen-denominated account opened at Bank A under the name of Bank C. This 500 million yen is temporarily locked (frozen).
2. Issuing a remittance instruction: Bank A issues a remittance instruction to Bank C as the receiving bank to recipient Y who has an account at Bank C.
3. Processing at Bank C: Following Bank A's instructions, Bank C calculates the equivalent of 500 million yen from its own assets and transfers it to Mr. Y's account. At the same time, it locks the transfer amount.
4. Notification and confirmation of remittance completion: Bank C notifies Bank A that the remittance is complete.
Once both banks confirm the transfer is complete, both parties will unlock the funds and the transaction will be officially completed.
5. Currency Handling:
Exchange rates are contractually agreed upon in advance and applied automatically at the time of transfer.
This allows for efficient hybrid cross-border transfers that combine currency conversion and instant transfer at the same time.
6.4 Demonstration cases and implementation status • Shinkin banks (e.g. S Shinkin) are preparing for small-scale demonstration implementation. • Regional banks and megabanks are in the discussion stage, and common specifications are being developed. • Adopt a phased implementation strategy:
1. Phase 1: Proof of concept for small amount/personal account transfers
2. Phase 2: Application to commercial transactions and inter-company payments
3. Phase 3: Full-scale implementation for large amount/international transfers
6.5 KPIs and quantitative evaluation (estimated)
• Average processing time: Approximately 1.2 seconds
• Processing success rate: 99.9999999998%
• Customer satisfaction (CSAT survey): 99% or more
• Initial implementation cost: Approximately 200 million yen (for a mid-sized bank)
• Annual cost reduction effect: Up to 600 million yen or more
• First year ROI (return on investment): Approximately 300% or more
6.6 Roadmap for implementation
• Establish common API/message specifications (ISO 20022 compliant)
• Experiment to open two-way reciprocal accounts in currency units
• Pilot operation among participating financial institutions and external evaluation
• Confirmation of legal application through discussion with the Financial Services Agency and the Bank of Japan
Verification of connectivity with international standardization organizations (ISO, BIS, etc.)
Chapter 7: Discussion & Future Prospects
7.1 Paradigm shift in interbank settlement infrastructure
Traditional interbank settlement has been operated based on centralized infrastructure such as BOJ-NET and SWIFT. While these are highly reliable, they have limitations in terms of immediacy, cost, scalability, and fault tolerance.
GRMtMAOS breaks away from this centralized architecture and proposes a distributed remittance network in which banks are directly interconnected. Just as the Internet decentralized communication through packet-switched networks, the world of payments is also beginning to shift to a "peer-to-peer" system.
This shift allows each bank to autonomously connect to the remittance network, localizing the scope of impact in the event of a failure and improving overall resilience.
2 Realization of ubiquitous remittance
GRMtMAOS is not limited to interbank payments, but can also link with a wide range of payment entities, such as:
• Non-bank payment operators (fund transfer operators)
• Digital wallet providers
• Central bank digital currency (CBDC) platforms
• Overseas bank networks
This will create a "ubiquitous remittance network" that can realize remittances 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, without geographic or currency restrictions. This can be developed as a complement or replacement of the existing RTGS and international transit network (SWIFT).
7.3 Institutional issues and standardization
The implementation of GRMtMAOS requires the following institutional issues to be cleared:
• Legal status of payments not going through Zengin-Net
• Consistency of deposit insurance and accounting procedures for accounts held in other banks
• Compliance with AML/CFT and KYC systems
• Standardization of contract formats and message definitions (ISO 20022 extension)
However, GRMtMAOS is an extension of the existing "nostro/vostro" account model, and there is little heterogeneity in terms of the system. Therefore, with gradual system adaptation and the development of guidelines, the hurdle to implementation is expected to be relatively low.
7.4.GRMtMAOS can also be developed into a hybrid architecture that combines the advantages of DLT-type payment systems (smart contracts, transparency) with the robustness of bank infrastructure.
7.5 International examples and effectiveness
The following challenges remain in cross-border remittances in emerging economies such as ASEAN and Latin America:
• High fees (3-10%)
• Delays in arrival of funds (2-5 business days)
• Lack of transparency through intermediary banks
• Market risk due to currency conversion
GRMtMAOS eliminates intermediary banks through a mutual deposit structure and enables instant and explicit exchange transactions (agreed in advance). In particular, it can be evaluated as a promising alternative in the context of regional financial integration based on multi-currency and multi-bank networks.
7.6 Legal Receptivity and Global Expansion
International organizations such as FATF and BIS have been working on legal arrangements for decentralized remittance schemes since the 2020s. In fact, more than 76% of countries in the world meet the minimum AML/CFT requirements, and the institutional groundwork for GRMtMAOS-type fiat-based remittances is being laid.
In developed countries, including Japan, GRMtMAOS can be legally operated within the framework of the Banking Act, the Fund Settlement Act, and the Foreign Exchange Act, and there are relatively few institutional obstacles.
From the above considerations, GRMtMAOS has the potential to become the core of the next-generation financial infrastructure as a decentralized, instant, and secure global remittance network. If it becomes more widespread along with the development of institutions and international standardization, we can see a future in which it will be used around the world as a "safe, inexpensive, and reliable" remittance method to replace centralized networks. We have reported on the contents of the reciprocal account network remittance system and a comparison with other digital cash and remittances.
The invention of this "Global Reciprocity Many-to-Many Account Opening System (GRMtMAOS)" was invented by the singing inventor kozykozy (M. Takashi).Thank you for viewing